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BENEFIT CORPORATION LAW
MarkJ . Loewenstein*

I. INTRODUCTION
Since 2010, thirty-one states and the District of Columbia1 have
adopted legislation authorizing the creation of a benefit corporation, 2
and an additional seven states are considering such legislation.3 This
legislation is based, to a greater or lesser extent , on Model Legislation
(the Model Legislation) 4 drafted for B Lab Company (B Lab), a
Pennsylvania nonprofit corporation that has been the driving force
behind the adoption of benefit corporation legislation across the
country. 6 Even those state statutes that vary from the Model Legislation
have been significantly influenced by it. 6 In this article, I explore some
of the more troubling features of the Model Legislation and consider the
non-Model Legislation variations adopted in Delaware and Colorado.
* Professor, University of Colorado Law School
1 . ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10 2401-10-2442 (2016); ARK. CODE ANN . §§ 4-36 101-401
(2016); CAL. CORP. CODE § 14600 (Deering 2016); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-101 -501-509 (2016); DEL
CODE . ANN . tit. 8, §§ 361-368 (2016); D.C. CODE §§ 29-1301.01-29-1304.01 (2016); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 607.601 - 607.613 (LexisNexis 2016); HAW . REV . STAT. §§ 420d l -420d- l 3.805 ( LexisNexis 2016);
IDAHO CODE §§ 30 2001-2013 (2016); 805 III. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 40/1 40/5.01 (LexisNexis 2016);
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1.3 1 1-10-5 (LexisNexis 2016); LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 1801-1832 (2016); MD.
CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS NS §§ 5 6c-01 to 08 ( LexisNexis 2016); MASS. ANN. LAWS CH . 156e, §§ 116 (LexisNexis 2016); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 304a.001 - 304a.301 (LexisNexis 2016); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§§ 355 (West 2016); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 21 401-21 414 (LexisNexis 2016); NEV. REV. STAT.
Ann. §§ 78b.010-190 (LexisNexis 2016); N . H. REV. STAT. ANN . § 293 c:1 293 c:13 ( LexisNexis
2016); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 14a:18 l 11 (West 2016); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §§ 1701-1709 (LexisNexis
2016); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 60.750 - 770 (LexisNexis 2016); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3301 3331
(2016); 7 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 7 5.3-1-7-5.3 13 (2016); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-38 110 (2016).; TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 48-28-101-109 (2016); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 16 10b- l 01-16 10b-402 (LexisNexis
2016); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11a, §§ 21.01-08 (2016); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1 782-791 (2016); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 23b.25.005 to .150 (LexisNexis 2016); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 31f-1 101-31 f-5 501
(LexisNexis 2016).
2 . The legislation in some of these jurisdictions does not use the term “ benefit corporation ,” but
rather employs some variation of it. For instance, the Colorado and Delaware acts use the term “ public
benefit corporation .” This article uses the term benefit corporation to refer to any entity formed under
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these laws.
3. State
State
CORP. ,
of
by
Status
BENEFIT
Legislation,
http://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/state- by-state-status ( last visited Oct . 17, 2016) (pending in Maska,
Oklahoma, Michigan, Georgia, Ohio, Iowa, and Kentucky).
4. Model Benefit Corporation Legislation , BENEFIT CORP. (Apr. 4, 2016),
http://benefitcorp. net/sites/default/files/Model%20Benefit%20Corp%20 Legislation 4 16. pdf.
5. See About B Lab , B CORP., https://www. bcorporation . net/what are-b-corps/about-b lab ( last
visited Oct 17, 2016).
6. See Alicia E. Plerhoples, Delaware Public Benefit Corporations 90 Days Out: Who’ s Opting
In? , 14 U .C. DAVIS BUS. L. J. 247, 253 (2014) (“ The statutory provisions of benefit corporations vary
slightly from state to state, but are each based on the [ Model Legislation] . . . .” ).
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But first, a word about the term “ benefit corporation.”
B Lab and its supporters have been insistent that jurisdictions
considering benefit corporation legislation adhere to the principles of the
Model Legislation or eschew the term benefit corporation, even though
B Lab does not own any rights to the term . 7 The widespread adoption
of benefit corporation legislation and the influence of the Model
Legislation on that legislation are testaments to the successful efforts of
B Lab. In fact, all but five of the adopting jurisdictions do use the term
benefit corporation and hew fairly closely to the Model Legislation .
B Lab’ s insistence on some semblance of uniformity in benefit
corporation legislation is rational. Investors, consumers, and others
dealing with what purports to be a benefit corporation should be able to
assume that it shares important characteristics with all other
corporations that are called benefit corporations, irrespective of where
that corporation may have been incorporated.8 On the other hand, as a
practical matter will investors and consumers differentiate between a
“ benefit corporation” and a “ public benefit corporation” (the term used
in Delaware and Colorado) or a “ benefit company” (the term used in
Oregon )? It seems unlikely that they would. 9 In any case, if an investor
or consumer were truly concerned with the way in which the benefit
corporation operated, he or she would have to do more than just rely on
the fact that the corporation was organized under the benefit corporation
provisions, a topic to which I will return below. To do otherwise would
be like treating all foods that are promoted as “ healthy” as being
comparably healthy. B Lab recognized this dilemma from its very
inception and has created a certification route for benefit corporations.
If a benefit corporation meets certain standards specified by B Lab, it is
eligible for certification as a Certified B Corp, a sort of “ Good

7. The author was a member of a Colorado Bar Association committee that worked on benefit
corporation legislation . During the course of that effort, as more fully documented in Herrick K.
Lidstone, Jr., The Long and Winding Road to Public Benefit Corporations in Colorado, COLO. LAW.,
Oct. 30, 2015, at 39, http:// papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cffn ?abstract id =2266654, the author was told
by representatives from B Lab that they would actively oppose any benefit corporation legislation that
did not meet with their approval, but we (the Bar committee) were free to propose legislation that did
not employ the “ benefit corporation ” term. The B Lab web site says this this about the issue: “ Using the
model legislation ensures that your state remains consistent with other states that have passed the
legislation . This is particularly important for investors who rely upon this consistency to reduce their
due diligence requirements when evaluating a company. The ability to recognize that a benefit
corporation is the same in Illinois as it is in Florida allows the free market to function effectively.” The
Model Legislation , BENEFIT CORP., http://benefitcorp.org/attomeys/model-legislation (last visited Oct .
17, 2016).
8. The Model Legislation , supra note 7.
9. Id. (The B Lab web site supports this conclusion: “ The new Delaware entity is technically
called Public Benefit Corporation (or PBC), but will typically be referred to colloquially as benefit
corporation .” ).

_
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Housekeeping Seal of Approval .” 10

II. SOME PROBLEMS WITH THE MODEL LEGISLATION
The Model Legislation was drafted by Bill Clark, a Philadelphia
lawyer, for his client, B Lab.11 As a result, the Model Legislation did
not have the benefit of a vetting process that other model legislation may
receive.12 For instance, model legislation promulgated by the American
Law Institute ( ALI), such as the Model Penal Code, benefits from the
input of a diverse group of advisors and consultants. These acts are
ultimately subject to a vote of approval by the membership of the ALI
and the entire process typically takes many years.13 That vetting
process helps insure a final product that represents the input of many
experts from across the entire country. Perhaps because of the absence
of such a process, the Model Legislation suffers from a number of
problems . Four of those problems, each of which was addressed in
some way by the Delaware and Colorado benefit corporation acts, are
described below.

A. The Purpose Clause
The Model Legislation has been revised, to the better, since its initial
publication in 2010. Nevertheless, some fundamental problems remain,
the first and foremost of which is its purpose clause. Unlike a regular
corporation, a benefit corporation must have as a purpose “ creating a
general public benefit,” 14 which is defined in the Model Legislation as
“ [a] material positive impact on society and the environment, taken as a
whole, assessed against a third-party standard, from the business and
operations.”15 All but a handful of businesses, however, cannot avoid
having a negative impact on the environment16 and even the most
“ green” businesses will have some sort of a carbon footprint and will
10. See How to Become a B Corp, B CORP., https://www. bcorporation .net/become-a- b-corp/howto become-a-b corp (last visited Oct 17, 2016).
11 . See The Model Legislation, supra note 7.
12 . Id. The web site where the Model Legislation is posted does state that it “ has evolved based
on input from state legislatures, state bar associations, Secretaries of State offices, Attorney General
offices, nonprofit groups and businesses.” Id. This input, however, occurred after the Model
Legislation was initially published and a comparison of that version and the most recent version (dated
April 4, 2016) indicates only minimal changes.

-

-

13. How the Institute Works , THE AM. L. INST., https://www.ali.org/about-ali /how-instituteworks/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2016).
14. Model Benefit Corporation Legislation, supra note 4, § 201 (a ).
15. Id . § 102.
16. A company in the business of cleaning up toxic waste dumps might be one that has a
material positive effect on the environment .
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use some nonrenewable energy resources, For instance, the B Lab
website lists, and includes a brief description of, certified B Corps,
among which is a company called Elemental Herbs.17 According to the
Elemental Herbs website, the company’ s mission is “ to harness the
natural powers of the environment’ s purest, most elemental ingredients
and organic herbs in order to offer natural healing products that are good
for people and good for the earth.” 18
Elemental Herbs reports on the B Lab website that it increases its use
of renewable energy annually, minimizes travel and its carbon footprint,
and that more than 5% of its energy comes from renewable sources.19
The company is obviously proud of its environmental policies. Another
way to read this disclosure, however, is that more than 90% of the
energy that Elemental Herbs uses comes from nonrenewable sources
and that it has a carbon footprint from travel and other activities . Not
disclosed in its listing on the B Lab website, but disclosed on its own
website, is that Elemental Herbs ships its products via FedEx , UPS, or
the U.S. Postal Service, 20 each of which, of course, has a negative effect
on the environment. Not disclosed on either the B Lab website or the
Elemental Herbs website is how the company gets the herbs and other
raw materials and ingredients that it needs for its product line to its
production facility. Presumably, this material is transported in some
way that has a negative environmental impact. What this demonstrates
is that Elemental Herbs can only really seek to minimize its
environmental impact; it cannot have a positive impact on the
environment . Moreover and this may be a mere quibble with the
language of the Model Legislation Elemental Herbs is in no position to
“ create” this or any general public benefit.21
The general public benefit definition has a second problem: in many
instances what is good for the environment (e.g ., shutting down a plant
that is powered by a nonrenewable fuel) is bad for society. A plant
shutdown results in unemployment, which, in turn, has secondary
negative effects on families, the local community, and other businesses,
such as suppliers, who are dependent on that plant, to name just a few
negative effects. The reverse is also true: what may be good for society

—

—

17. All Good by Elemental Herbs, B CORP., https://www. bcorporation.net/community/all -goodelemental- herbs (last visited Oct, 17 2016).
18. Good Story , ELEMENTAL HERBS, http ://www.elementalherbs.com/about-us- l / (last visited
Oct 17, 2016).
19. All Good by Elemental Herbs, supra note 17.
20. Shipping, ELEMENTAL HERBS, http://www.elementalherbs.eom/shipping/ (last visited Oct 17,
2016).
21 . See Mark J. Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: A Challenge to Corporate Governance, 68
Bus. LAW. 1007, 1014 (2013) (“ The Model [ Act] provides no guidance as to what it means to ‘create’ a
general . . . public benefit . . . . A more apt term may be ‘pursue.’ ” ).
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may be bad for the environment. Communities compete vigorously for
new factories and other businesses because increased employment and
economic activity is good in so many ways for a community, yet
inevitably, there is a negative effect on the environment. In sum, the
required general public benefit purpose clause creates an unrealistic and
conflicting mandate on the benefit corporation. The Colorado and
Delaware statutes, which are discussed below, address this shortcoming.
Finally, the Model Legislation permits a benefit corporation to have
as a purpose a “ specific public benefit,” but such a purpose must be in
addition to, not in lieu of, the general public benefit purpose described
above. The Model Legislation lists examples of specific public benefit
purposes, e.g., “ providing low-income or underserved individuals or
communities with beneficial products or services; promoting economic
opportunity for individuals or communities beyond the creation of jobs
improving human health; [and] promoting the arts, science, or
advancement of knowledge.” 22 These are all worthwhile activities, but
if a corporation is formed to achieve one or more of the goals, say
promoting the advancement of knowledge, it cannot use the benefit
corporation provisions unless it also has as a purpose of creating a
material positive impact on society and the environment. It may be the
organizers determine that they cannot achieve both the general public
benefit and the specific public benefit in which they have a particular
interest. They therefore must forgo the benefit corporation label. The
Delaware and Colorado approach also corrects this, as more fully
described below.
B. The Annual Report
The Model Legislation requires the benefit corporation to prepare an
annual report describing, among other things, “ [t]he ways in which [it]
pursued [the] general public benefit during the year and the extent to
which [the] general public benefit was created.” 23 The report must be
sent to shareholders, posted on the company’ s web site, and filed with
the secretary of state.24 As noted above, the benefit corporation likely
cannot “ create” a “ material positive impact on society and the
environment.” More difficult, however, is the requirement that the
benefit corporation assess its “ overall social and environmental
22 . Model Benefit Corporation Legislation, supra note 4, § 102.
23. Id. § 401(a)( l )(i).
24. Id. § 402. Most states that have adopted benefit corporation legislation have done away with
the filing requirement, including California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawai’ i, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Montana, Nevada, New York, Oregon, Tennessee, Virginia,
Vermont, Washington, and West Virginia.
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performance” 25 against a “ third-party standard” that meets certain
defined criteria set forth in the benefit corporation statute. 26 Among
other things, for instance, the Model Legislation requires that the
selected third-party standard have publicly available information about
the “ identity of the directors, officers, material owners, and the
governing body of the entity that developed and controls revisions to the
standard.” 27 It is unusual, to say the least, for legislation to require
companies to assess themselves using a third-party standard that
satisfies such detailed criteria. This is the sort of requirement best left to
the private sector; that is, a certifying organization, such as B Lab, might
insist that as a condition to receiving and maintaining a B Corp
certification, the applicant must engage in a self-assessment along the
lines that the Model Legislation mandates. But the state interest in such
requirement is difficult to see and, inasmuch B Lab meets the statutory
requirement of providing a third-party standard, smacks of self-interest.
More importantly, however, one might question the wisdom of
requiring such an annual report. How can a company reasonably assess
the extent to which its actions had a material positive effect on society
and the environment? How could Elemental Herbs, for instance,
measure its carbon footprint, given that it ships its products all over the
country (and, perhaps, the world)? And what would be the value of
such an assessment? Its report for 2016, posted on the B Lab web site,
is opaque, to say the least. 28
Elemental Herbs assesses its
environmental practices with a score of “ 23,” but its community
practices at “ 0,” with an “ overall” score of “ 106.” There is no indication
what these scores mean, except that a footnote indicates that to maintain
its B Corp certification, the reporting benefit corporation needs a
minimum score of 80.
Moreover, like almost all benefit corporations, Elemental Herbs is a
privately held business. Wouldn’ t its owners/employees be fully aware
of its activities without seeking to quantify them? The requirement of
an annual report is one that investors in a benefit corporation can insist
upon as a condition to their investment, if they so desire, and shape that
report in a way that is meaningful to them. As to others, such as
consumers who may be interested in an assessment of the societal and
environmental impact of a benefit corporation, it is fanciful to think that
they will go to a company’ s website, download the report, and then be
25 . Id. § 401(a)(2).
26. Id.
27. Id. § 102.
28. All Good by Elemental Herbs 2016 B Impact Report, B CORP.,
https:// www.bcorporation .net/community/all -good-elemental- herbs/impact-report/2016-01 -25-000000
( last visited Oct . 17, 2016).
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able to make an intelligent decision as to how the company’ s
performance compares to other possible purveyors of the goods or
services that they are interested in. The Elemental Herbs report amply
bears this out. The certification of a third party is much more useful to
the consumer and private ordering is much more efficient for the
investor. The Delaware statute addresses the annual report in a more
evenhanded fashion, as more fully developed below.

C. The Benefit Enforcement Proceeding.
The Model Legislation creates a new cause of action, called a “ benefit
enforcement proceeding” and defined as a claim for “ (1) failure of a
benefit corporation to pursue or create [the] general public benefit or a
specific public benefit set forth in its articles; or (2) violation of any
obligation, duty, or standard of conduct under this chapter.” 29 Section
305 of the Model Legislation makes clear that a benefit enforcement
proceeding is the exclusive cause of action against the benefit
corporation or its directors or officers for claims covered by its
definition and that the benefit corporation “ shall not be liable for
monetary damages , ” 30 The benefit enforcement proceeding may be
brought “ directly” by the benefit corporation or “ derivatively” by
shareholders owning at least 2% of the outstanding stock; a director;
shareholders of the parent corporation of a benefit corporation; or “ other
persons as specified in the articles of incorporation or bylaws of the
benefit corporation.” 31 Finally, two other sections of the Model
Legislation (sections 302(e) and 303(c)) exonerate directors and
officers, respectively, from personal liability.
There are problems with this statutory scheme. First, it is odd, to say
the least, for a corporation to bring a “ direct” cause of action against its
officers or directors for nonmonetary relief. Are we to presume that the
board of directors would authorize a cause of action seeking
nonmonetary relief against themselves for, say, failing to create a
general public benefit? That is inconceivable: why would they do such
a thing and what good could possible come of it?
Second, as to derivative actions, the Model Legislation provides
standing to directors who, traditionally, do not have standing to maintain
a derivative action; typically only shareholders have standing to
maintain a derivative action. 32 More fundamentally, any such derivative
action seems doomed to failure. Under the evolving jurisprudence of
29.
30.
31.
32.

Model Benefit Corporation Legislation, supra note 4, § 102 .
Id. § 305 .
A/. § 305(c).
See, e.g. , FED. R . Crv. P. 23.1(b ).
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derivative litigation, any shareholder who desires to maintain such an
action must first make a demand on the board of directors that it take
some action with respect to the wrong of which the shareholder
complains, unless the shareholder can plead, with particularity, why
such demand would be futile . 33 If the board refuses the demand, its
decision would be protected by the business judgment rule . The
plaintiff-shareholder would have to overcome the presumptions of that
rule, presumptions that protect the decision from judicial examination.34
Overcoming those presumptions is, thus, a high bar for the plaintiff. If
the board rejects the demand, the shareholder’ s role in the litigation is
over. 35 Similarly, if the board accepts the demand, “ the corporation
supplants the derivative plaintiff for the purpose of enforcing its
corporate rights.” 36 Finally, even if the shareholder is able to prosecute
the action because, for instance, it was able to avoid the demand
requirement, the board of directors can appoint a “ special litigation
committee” to consider whether the action should go forward or on what
basis it should be resolved. 37 Consequently, and especially since
monetary relief is precluded by the statute, there is little incentive to
bring such a claim. Unsurprisingly, there are no reported instances of
derivative litigation involving a benefit corporation.
Third, the persons with the greatest incentive to sue the benefit
corporation the beneficiaries of its specific public benefit are
expressly denied standing unless the articles or bylaws otherwise
provide, and even then these persons would not be able to obtain
monetary relief. And, it is difficult to imagine a benefit corporation
providing in its articles or bylaws that members of the public have
standing to sue it for failing to “ create or pursue” a general or specific
public benefit.
In sum, the benefit enforcement proceeding provisions provide an
ephemeral remedy against (and perhaps for) the benefit corporation that
does not create or pursue the public benefits set forth in its articles. I
surmise that the drafters determined that some remedy was necessary,
but the remedy so provided is, at best, an illusion of one. The drafters of
the Delaware act appear to agree with this assessment, as more fully

—

—

33 . Delaware has adopted the “ demand futility” rule. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del.
1984). A number of states have adopted the “ universal demand” rule that is set out in the MODEL BUS.
CORP. ACT § 7.42 (ABA 2002) and requires demand in all cases.
34. See generally, JAMES D. Cox & THOMAS L. HAZEN, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS LAW 198200 (3rd ed . 2011 ).
35. Id . at 454 (“ Most courts hold that, if an independent board decides in good faith against the
demand (that is, rejects the demand), the directors’ refusal to sue falls within the business judgment rule,
and the suit must be dismissed.” ).
36. Id. at 453-54.
37. Id. at 459-68.
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described below.

D. The Benefit Director
The early versions of the Model Legislation required that each benefit
corporation have a benefit director. Although a later iteration limited the
requirement to “ publicly traded” benefit corporations,38 the current
version eliminates the requirement.39 For benefit corporations that elect
to have a benefit director, the benefit director must be “ independent” 40
and is charged by section 302(c) of the Model Legislation with the
responsibility of preparing an opinion, for inclusion in the benefit
corporation’ s annual report, indicating:
“ (1) whether the benefit corporation acted in accordance with its
general public benefit purpose and any specific public benefit purpose in
all material respects during the period covered by the report;”
(2) whether the directors and officers, when discharging their duties
to the corporation, considered the effects of any “ action or inaction” on
the shareholders, employees, suppliers, customers, the community, the
local and global environment, etc.; and
(3) if the directors or officers failed to satisfy (1) or (2), “ a description
of the ways in which the benefit corporation or its directors or officers
failed to act or comply.” 41
This opinion places a heavy burden on the benefit director. For
instance, it is difficult to understand what the “ in all material respects”
requirement of section (1) means. This language is typically used in
legal opinions when the recipient of the opinion seeks assurances that its
counterparty complied “ in all material respects” with a binding covenant
or agreement. A lender may wish to know, for example, that its
borrower complied with the covenants in the loan agreement that
required the borrower to perform certain obligations and refrain from
taking certain actions. The attorney preparing the opinion would have to
inquire of the client what actions the client took (and refrained from
taking) with respect to each such covenant or agreement and then
determine whether the client complied “ in all material respects.” The
attorney may have to make a judgment as to whether a failure on the
part of the client was material in order to give (or withhold) the opinion.
38. Model Benefit Corporation Legislation , BENEFIT CORP. (June 24, 2014) § 302.
http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/documents/Model Benefit Corp Legislation .pdf
39. Model Benefit Corporation Legislation, supra note 4, § 302.
40. Model Benefit Corporation Legislation , supra note 4, § 102. “ Independent” is defined as
“ [h]aving no material relationship with a benefit corporation or a subsidiary of the benefit corporation .”
Id. The definition provides examples of relationships that “ will be conclusively presumed” to negate
independence, including owning 5% of more of the outstanding shares of the benefit corporation . Id.
41. Id. § 302(c).

_

_ _
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It is entirely unclear how these concepts translate for an opinion under
the Model Legislation . The general public benefit is, in essence, an
aspiration of the benefit corporation; having a positive effect on society
and the environment is unmeasurable and , therefore, not amenable to an
opinion that the benefit corporation “ acted in accordance” with that
aspiration “ in all material respects.” Insofar as section 302(c)(1 ) is
concerned, therefore, the opinion is likely to be perfunctory and
conclusory.
Section 302(c)(2) is equally challenging. The directors of a benefit
corporation are required by section 301(a) to take into account the
effects of any action they take or any “ inaction” on a long list of what
might be called stakeholders in the corporation’ s activities, although the
Model Legislation does not use the term “ stakeholder.” The benefit
director has to opine on whether the officers and director in fact
discharged that responsibility. To render such an opinion, the benefit
director apparently would have to consider each action and inaction of
the board of directors and corporate officers, an impossible task if the
corporation is actively engaged in business. How is the benefit director
even to know of every action, much less “ inaction,” taken by each
officer and director?
Subsection (3) is nearly as daunting, requiring the benefit director to
describe the ways in which they “ failed to act or comply.” This opinion
imposes on the benefit director the obligation of determining, among
other things, how the board or officers might have assessed the
environmental or societal impact of an action they declined to take. For
instance, if the board was offered the opportunity to acquire a competing
business, but declined to consider the offer, did the board breach its
obligations by failing to consider the environmental and societal effects
if they had decided to make the acquisition? Posing the question has an
absurd quality, but the obligation so described is certainly within the
plain language of the Model Legislation. Again, the opinion is likely to
be perfunctory and of minimal value. Considering the absence of
monetary liability for the benefit director and the cost of a thorough
opinion (assuming one could in good faith be rendered), the incentives
do not point in the direction of a meaningful opinion .
III. THE DELAWARE AND COLORADO ACTS.

As noted above, B Lab and its supporters have been insistent that
states adopting benefit corporation legislation hew to the terms of the
Model Legislation and they opposed legislation that deviated too much
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therefrom . 42 As a result of this policy, B Lab and a committee of the
Colorado Bar Association (the Committee) opposed one another for
several years over benefit corporation legislation . 43 The stalemate was
broken in 2013 when the Committee became aware of a proposed
benefit corporation bill in Delaware that had received the backing of B
Lab and seemed to meet at least some of the objections that the
Committee had to the Model Legislation. 44 In particular, the Committee
objected to provisions in the Model Legislation that required every
benefit corporation to have the purpose of creating a general public
benefit (as defined), prepare an annual report based on a third-party
standard, allow for a benefit enforcement proceeding (as set out in the
Model Legislation), and include a benefit director. The Delaware
proposal (subsequently enacted into law) and the Colorado statute,
which closely tracked the Delaware proposal, addressed these problems.
A. The Purpose Clause
The Delaware and Colorado statutes provide that a benefit
corporation (called a “ public benefit corporation” 45 in the statutes) “ is a
for-profit corporation . . . that is intended to produce a public benefit or
public benefits and to operate in a responsible and sustainable
manner.” 46 Public benefit is defined as “ a positive effect (or reduction
of negative effects ) on one or more categories of persons, entities,
communities or interests (other than stockholders in their capacities as
stockholders) including, but not limited to, effects of an artistic,
charitable, cultural, economic, educational, environmental, literary,
medical, religious, scientific or technological nature , ” 47 Thus, under
this approach a benefit corporation may identify one or more benefits
that it wishes to pursue and still qualify as a benefit corporation . It need
not have as a purpose creating a material positive impact on society and
the environment. In addition, the option found in the Model Legislation
42 . Id. § 102. It is unclear what deviations B Lab would accept. From the author’ s personal
experience as a member of the Colorado Bar Association committee that had responsibility for the
benefit corporation legislation in Colorado, B Lab would not accept an act that did not require an annual
assessment based on a third-party standard, as described in the Model Legislation.
43. See Lidstone, supra note 7, at 5-6 (discussing this process).
44. Id.
45. The author is unaware of why Delaware opted for the term “ public benefit corporation ” as
opposed to simply “ benefit corporation .” The Committee decided that the simplest course of action was
to adopt the Delaware bill, making only those changes that were necessary to comply with Colorado
law. As noted in the text, however, B Lab was able to get the Colorado legislature to accept a few
changes to the Delaware model, making Colorado closer to the Model Legislation than the Delaware
act .

46. DEL. CODE ANN. tit . 8, § 362(a ) (2016) (emphasis added ).
47. Id . § 362(b) (emphasis added ).
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to identify an optional “ specific public benefit” is mooted; the benefit
corporation can identify as many or as few public benefits as it wishes.
Importantly, the Delaware and Colorado statutes do require the
benefit corporation to “ be managed in a manner that balances the
stockholders’ pecuniary interests, the best interests of those materially
affected by the corporation’ s conduct, and the public benefit or public
benefits identified in its certificate of incorporation.” 48 B Lab, in a press
release posted on its website, referred to this provision, writing that the
Delaware statute “ embraces the critical idea of model benefit
corporation legislation: a general public benefit that requires the
consideration of all stakeholders affected by the corporation’ s
conduct. 49 Interestingly, in this press release B Lab tweaks the idea of a
general public benefit; it clearly does not mean a material positive
impact on society and the environment . Rather, in the press release the
term seems to mean any benefit to the public, which is the essence of the
Delaware and Colorado legislation.

B. The Annual Report.

Another substantive change reflected in the Delaware statute (but not
the Colorado statute) is that the requirement of an annual report is
replaced with a biennial one, and most importantly, the assessment may,
but need not, be measured against a third-party standard. This was one
of the key sticking points in the negotiations that the Committee had
with B Lab representatives during the course of the consideration of the
Colorado benefit corporation legislation. Obviously, the drafters of the
Delaware legislation had a similar concern, but prevailed. When the
Delaware draft was embraced by the Committee, B Lab had little choice
but to agree to support it in Colorado, but B Lab insisted (and prevailed)
on including a requirement that the annual report include an assessment
against a third-party standard, as defined .
C. The Benefit Enforcement Proceeding
The Delaware and Colorado statutes greatly streamline the provisions
related to benefit enforcement proceedings. They limit standing to
shareholders who own at least two percent of the corporation’ s
outstanding shares. For corporations with shares listed on a national
securities exchange, the threshold is the lesser of two percent or two
million dollars in market value. 60 Gone is the possibility of a direct
48. Id. § 362(a).
49. See Lidstone, supra note 7, at 6.
50 . DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 367; COLO. REV. STAT. § 7 101-508 (2016).
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action by the corporation or derivative standing for directors,
stockholders of a parent corporation, or other persons specified in the
articles or bylaws.
D. The Benefit Director.

Finally, the Delaware and Colorado statutes do away with even the
option of a benefit director. The original version of the Model
Legislation included a requirement that each benefit corporation have a
benefit director. A later version limited the requirement to publicly held
corporations and the current version eliminates the requirement entirely.
By acquiescing in the Delaware version of benefit corporation
legislation, B Lab may be recognizing that the benefit director concept
has serious flaws. The requirement makes little sense in a close
corporation, as the corporation likely would have to locate, hire, and
compensate someone, independent of the corporation (as defined in the
Model Legislation), to fulfill the role. This added expense adds little
value to the corporation . In a publicly held benefit corporation (of
which there are very few), the burden added to the benefit director may
make it difficult to locate a suitable individual . Finally, the main
function of the benefit director to opine on the extent to which the
benefit corporation achieved its public benefit purpose is of
questionable value to the corporation’ s stakeholders, as discussed above .

—

—

IV. CONCLUSION
Benefit corporations have been around for a relatively short time, yet
a majority of the states have adopted authorizing legislation and
hundreds of entities have formed under the provisions of those laws.51
Most of this legislation follows the Model Legislation, flawed though it
may be. Delaware and Colorado have eschewed many of the provisions
of the Model Legislation, and modified others, creating laws that are
more flexible for social entrepreneurs. Whether future adoptions are
based on the Model Legislation or on the Delaware model remains to be
seen, but the Delaware model does present a real alternative to the

51. For a listing, see Find a Benefit Corp , BENEFIT CORP., http://benefitcorp.org/businesses/finda -benefit-corp?field _ bcorp certified value=&state=&title=:&submit2=Go&sort by=title&sort order=
ASC&op=Go ( last visited Oct . 17, 2016).

_
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Model Legislation, providing more of an “ enabling act”
prescriptive legislation. 52

than

52. See Plerhoples, supra note 6, at 250 (“ [T] he [ Delaware act is] less restrictive than [the Model
Legislation ] .” ). This is unsurprising. The Delaware General Corporation Law is “ an enabling statute
intended to permit corporations and their shareholders the maximum flexibility in ordering their
affairs. . . . [I]t is written with a bias against regulation.” LEWIS S. BLACK, JR., DEL. DEPT OF STATE,
DELAWARE
at
(2007)
2,
CHOOSE
CORPORATIONS
WHY
https://corp.delaware . gov/ pdfs/whycorporations english . pdf .
,
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